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Abstract
This paper revisits formalizations of information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement protocols
which are very fundamental primitives in cryptography. In general, we can formalize information-theoretic security in various
ways: some of them can be formalized as stand-alone security by extending (or relaxing) Shannon’s perfect secrecy or by other
ways such as semantic security; some of them can be done based on composable security. Then, a natural question about this is:
what is the gap between the formalizations? To answer the question, we investigate relationships between several formalizations
of information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement protocols. Specifically, for symmetric-key
encryption protocols in a general setting including the case where there exist decryption-errors, we deal with the following
formalizations of security: formalizations extended (or relaxed) from Shannon’s perfect secrecy by using mutual information and
statistical distance; information-theoretic analogues of indistinguishability and semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali; and
composable security by Maurer et al. and Canetti. Then, we explicitly show the equivalence and non-equivalence between those
formalizations. Under the model, we also derive lower bounds on the adversary’s (or distinguisher’s) advantage and the size of
secret-keys required under all of the above formalizations. Although some of them may be already known, we can explicitly
derive them all at once through our relationships between the formalizations. In addition, we briefly observe impossibility results
which easily follow from the lower bounds. The similar results are also shown for key agreement protocols in a general setting
including the case where there exist agreement-errors in the protocols.
Index Terms
information-theoretic security, unconditional security, perfect secrecy, indistinguishability, semantic security, composable se-
curity, encryption, key agreement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Background and Related Works. The security of cryptographic protocols in information-theoretic cryptography does
not require any computational assumption based on computationally hard problems, such as the integer factoring and discrete
logarithm problems. In addition, since the security definition in information-theoretic cryptography is formalized by use of some
information-theoretic measure (e.g. entropy or statistical distance) or some probability (e.g., success probability of adversary’s
guessing), it does not depend on a specific computational model and can provide security which does not compromise even if
computational technology intensively develops or a new computational technology (e.g. quantum computation) appears in the
future. In this sense, it is interesting to study and develop cryptographic protocols with information-theoretic security.
As fundamental cryptographic protocols we can consider symmetric-key encryption and key-agreement protocols, and the
model of the protocols falls into a very simple and basic scenario where there are two honest players (named Alice and Bob)
and an adversary (named Eve). Up to date, various results on the topic of those protocols with information-theoretic security
have been reported and developed since Shannon’s work [30]. In most of those results the traditional security definition has been
given as stand-alone security in the sense that the protocols will be used in a stand-alone way: in symmetric-key encryption, the
security is formalized as I(M ;C) = 0 (Shannon’s perfect secrecy) or its variant (e.g. I(M ;C) ≤ ǫ for some small ǫ), where
M and C are random variables which take values in sets of plaintexts and ciphertexts, respectively; similarly, in key agreement
the security is usually formalized as I(K;T ) = 0 or its variant (e.g. I(K;T ) ≤ ǫ), where K and T are random variables which
take values on sets of shared keys and transcripts, respectively. In addition, it is possible to give security formalizations of
symmetric-key encryption by an information-theoretic analogue of indistinguishability or semantic security by Goldwasser and
Micali [15]. The problem with those definition of stand-alone security is that, if a protocol is composed with other ones, the
security of the combined protocol may not be clear. Namely, it is not always guaranteed that the composition of individually
secure protocols results in the secure protocol, where secure is meant in the sense of the traditional definition of stand-alone
security.
This paper was presented in part at 2011 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT2011) [16] and 2013 IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory (ISIT2013) [31].
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2On the other hand, composable security (or security under composition) can guarantee that a protocol remains to be secure
after composed with other ones. The previous frameworks of this line of researches are based on the ideal-world/real world
paradigm, and the paradigm includes universal composability by Canetti [6] and reactive simulatability by Backes, Pfitzmann
and Waidner [2] (See also [5], [27], [14], [26], [3] for related works). In addition, the explicit and simple paradigm for
composable security was given by Maurer [21], and this approach is called constructive cryptography where the security
definitions of cryptographic systems can be understood as constructive statements: the idea is to consider cryptographic protocols
as transformations which construct cryptographically stronger systems from weaker ones. Using the framework of constructive
cryptography, Maurer and Tackmann [24] studied the authenticate-then-encrypt paradigm for symmetric-key encryption with
computational security. Furthermore, Maurer and Renner [22] proposed a new framework in an abstract way, called abstract
cryptography. The framework is described at a higher level of abstraction than [21], [24], and various notions and methodologies
(e.g. universal composability [6], reactive simulatability [2], and indifferentiability [23]) can be captured in the framework.
Up to date, there are a few works which report a gap between formalizations of the stand-alone security and composable
security for multiparty computation in information-theoretic settings [1], [11], [18]. In particular, Kushilevitz, Lindell and Rabin
[18] investigated the gap between them in several settings (i.e., perfect/statistical security and composition with adaptive/fixed
inputs), and they showed a condition that a protocol having stand-alone security is not necessarily secure under universal
composition.
Our Contributions. We can formalize information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement protocols
in various ways: some of them can be formalized as stand-alone security by extending Shannon’s perfect secrecy or by other
ways such as semantic security; some of them can be done based on composable security. Then, a natural question about
this is: what is the gap between the formalizations? To answer the question, we investigate relationships between several
formalizations of information-theoretic security for symmetric-key encryption and key agreement protocols. Specifically, we
deal with the model of symmetric-key encryption protocols in a general setting where encryption/decryption algorithms can be
arbitrary (i.e., deterministic or randomized), or protocols can have decryption-errors. In the model, we investigate the following
formalizations of security:
(i) Traditional formalization extended (or relaxed) from Shannon’s perfect secrecy by using the mutual information;
(ii) Another traditional one extended (or relaxed) from Shannon’s perfect secrecy by using the statistical distance (a.k.a. the
variational distance);
(iii) Formalization by information-theoretic analogue of indistinguishability by Goldwasser and Micali [15];
(iv) Formalization by information-theoretic analogue of semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali [15];
(v) Formalizations of composable security by Maurer et al. [22], [24] and Canetti [5], [6].
The main contribution of this paper is to explicitly show that relationships between those formalizations, and to reveal the
conditions that those formalizations being (non)equivalent in details. Under the model, we also derive lower bounds on the
adversary’s (or distinguisher’s) advantage and secret-key size required under all of the above formalizations. Although some of
them may be already known, we can explicitly derive them all at once through our relationships between the formalizations in
combination with the lower bound shown by Pope [28] in which the security definition is given based on Maurer’s formalization
for composable security. In addition, we briefly observe impossibility results which easily follow from the lower bounds.
Furthermore, we show similar results (i.e., relationships between formalizations, lower bounds, and impossibility results)
for key agreement protocols in a general setting where the channels used are unidirectional/bidirectional, the round number of
protocols is arbitrary, and the protocols can have agreement-errors.
Other Works Related. Bellare, Tessaro, and Vardy [4] recently study security definitions and schemes for encryption in the
model of the wiretap channels [34]. In particular, in the model of wiretap channels, they showed that the following formalizations
of stand-alone security are equivalent: formalizations extended (or relaxed) from Shannon’s perfect secrecy by using the mutual
information and statistical distance; information-theoretic indistinguishability which is called distinguishing security in [4]; and
information-theoretic semantic security. Although the main scope of their paper lies in the wiretap channel and it is different
from the model in this paper, their approach and ours are similar. They also showed that the first formalization by using mutual
information with restriction on that only uniformly distributed plaintexts are input is weaker than those formalizations.
Recently, in a simple and elemental way, Dodis [10] directly derives a lower bound on secret-key size required for symmetric-
key encryption, which may have decryption-errors, with specifying required running time of an adversary where the security
definition is given based on a simulation-based formalization under bounded/unbounded adversaries. One of lower bounds in
Corollary 1 in this paper is the same as his lower bound, and interestingly, our technique and his for deriving it are quite
different.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we survey composable security and its formalization
based on [22], [24] which is similar in spirit to previous ones in [2], [5], [6], [27]. In Section III, we explain the protocol
execution of symmetric-key encryption in a general setting, and we give several formalizations of correctness and security in our
model. Section IV is devoted to the main contribution of the paper, and we show the relationships between those formalizations
for symmetric-key encryption protocols, and reveal conditions for equivalence and non-equivalence of the formalizations. In
3addition, we derive lower bounds on adversary’s (or distinguisher’s) advantage and the size of secret-keys required under all the
formalizations. Furthermore, impossibility results are briefly observed. In Section V, we show similar results for key agreement
protocols as well. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section VI.
Notation. In this paper, for a random variable X which takes values in a finite set X , the min-entropy and Hartley entropy of
X (i.e., log of the cardinality of the set) are denoted by H∞(X) and H0(X), respectively. Also, I(X ;Y ) denotes the mutual
information between X and Y , and we denote the statistical distance between two distributions PX and PY by ∆(PX , PY ).
For completeness, we describe the definitions in Appendix A.
For an n-tuples of random variables (X1, X2, . . . , Xn), we denote its associated probability distribution by PX1X2...Xn . In
this paper, for a random variable X which takes values in X , we especially write PXX for the distribution on X ×X defined
by PXX(x, x′) := PX(x) if x = x′, and PXX(x, x′) := 0 if x 6= x′. Furthermore, |X | denotes the cardinality of X . Also, let
P(X ) be the set of all distributions over X whose supports are X , i.e., P(X ) := {PX | Supp(PX) = X}.
II. COMPOSABLE SECURITY
In this paper, we consider a very basic scenario where there are three entities, Alice, Bob (honest players), and Eve (an
adversary).
A. Definition of Systems
Following the notions in [22], [24], we describe three types of systems: resources, converters and distinguishers (See [22],
[24] for more details).
A resource is a system with three interfaces labeled A, B, and E, where A, B, and E imply three entities, Alice, Bob, and
Eve, respectively. If two resources R,S are used in parallel, this system is called parallel composition of R and S and denoted
by R ‖ S. We note that R ‖ S is also a resource.
A converter is a system with two kinds of interfaces: the first kind of interfaces are designated as the inner interfaces which
can be connected to interfaces of a resource, and combining a converter and a resource by the connection results in a new
resource; the second kind of interfaces are designed as the outer interfaces which can be provided as the new interfaces of the
combined resource. For a resource R and a converter π, we write π(R) for the system obtained by combining R and π, and
π(R) behaves as a resource, again. A protocol is a pair of converters π = (πA, πB) for the honest players, Alice and Bob,
and the resulting system by applying π to a resource R is denoted by π(R) or πAπB(R). For converters (or protocols) π, φ,
the sequential composition of them, denoted by φ ◦ π, is defined by (φ ◦ π)(R) := φ(π(R)) for a resource R. In contrast, the
parallel composition of converters (or protocols) π, φ, denoted by π ‖ φ, is defined by (π ‖ φ)(R ‖ S) := π(R) ‖ φ(S) for
resources R,S.
A distinguisher for an n-interface resource is a system with n + 1 interfaces: n interfaces are connected to n interfaces
of the resource, respectively; and the other interface outputs a bit (i.e., 1 or 0). For a resource R and a distinguisher D, we
write DR for the system obtained by combining R and D, and we regard DR as a binary random variable. The purpose of
distinguishers is to distinguish two resources, and the advantage of a distinguisher D for two resources R0, R1 is defined by
∆D(R0, R1) := ∆(PDR0 , PDR1),
where PDR0 and PDR1 are the probability distributions of the binary random variables DR0 and DR1, respectively. Let D be
the set of all distinguishers, and we define
∆D(R0, R1) := sup
D∈D
∆D(R0, R1).
Note that D contains not only polynomial-time distinguishers but also computationally unbounded ones, since this paper deals
with information-theoretic security.
B. Definition of Security
The security definition we focus on in this paper is derived from the paradigm of constructive cryptography [21]. Technically,
the formal definition is based on the works in [22], [24] (see [22], [24] for details), and is similar in spirit to previous simulation-
based definitions in [2], [5], [6], [27]. The idea in the paradigm of constructive cryptography includes comparison of the real
and ideal systems: the real system means construction π(R) by applying a protocol π to a resource R; and the ideal system
consists of the ideal functionality (such as ideal channels) S including description of a security goal and a simulator σ connected
to the interface of E, which we denote by σ(S). If the difference of the two resources, π(R) and σ(S), is a small quantity
(i.e., ∆D(π(R), σ(S)) ≤ ǫ for small ǫ), we consider that the protocol π securely constructs S from R. More formally, we
define the security as follows.
Definition 1 ([22], [24]): For resources R,S, we say that a protocol π constructs S from R with error ǫ ∈ [0, 1], denoted
by R π,ǫ=⇒ S, if the following two conditions are satisfied:
41) Availability: For the set of all distinguishers D, we have ∆D(π(⊥E(R)),⊥E(S)) ≤ ǫ, where ⊥E is the converter which
blocks the E-interface for distinguishers when it is attached to R.
2) Security: There exists a simulator σ such that, for the set of all distinguishers D, we have ∆D(π(R), σ(S)) ≤ ǫ.
In the above definition, we do not require the condition that the simulator is efficient (i.e., polynomial-time). In other words,
the simulator may be inefficient.
The advantage of the above security definition lies in that a protocol having this kind of security remains to be secure even
if it is composed with other protocols. Formally, this can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1 ([22], [24]): Let R,S, T and U be resources, and let π, φ be converters (or protocols) such that R π,ǫ=⇒ S and
S
φ,δ
=⇒ T . Then, we have the following:
(1) φ ◦ π satisfies R φ◦π,ǫ+δ=⇒ T ;
(2) π ‖ id satisfies R ‖ U π‖id,ǫ=⇒ S ‖ U ; and
(3) id ‖ π satisfies U ‖ R id‖π,ǫ=⇒ U ‖ S,
where id is the trivial converter which makes the interfaces of the subsystem accessible through the interfaces of the combined
system.
We note that the first property in Proposition 1 means the security for sequential composition. In addition, as stated in [22]
three properties in Proposition 1 imply the security for parallel composition in the following sense: For resources R,R′, S, S′
and converters π, φ such that R π,ǫ=⇒ S and R′ φ,δ=⇒ S′, π ‖ φ satisfies R ‖ R′ π‖φ,ǫ+δ=⇒ S ‖ S′.
C. Ideal Functionality/Channels
In this section, we give several definitions of ideal functionality of resources such as the authenticated channel and key
sharing resources which are necessary to discuss in this paper.
• Authenticated Channel: An authenticated channel usable once, denoted by s−→ , transmits a message (or a plaintext)
m from Alice’s interface (i.e., A-interface) to Bob’s interface (i.e., B-interface) without any error/replacement. If Eve is
active, through the E-interface Eve obtains m, and she obtains nothing, otherwise. Similarly, an authenticated channel
from B-interface to A-interface can be defined and denoted by s←− . For a positive integer t, we write ( s−→)t for the
composition of invoked t authenticated channels s−→‖ s−→‖ · · · ‖ s−→ (t times), and we write ( s−→ )∞ if arbitrarily
many use of s−→ is allowed. Similarly, ( s←− )t and ( s←− )∞ can be defined.
• Secure Channel: A secure channel usable once, denoted by s−→ s, transmits a plaintext m from A-interface to B-interface
without any error/replacement. Even if Eve is active, she obtains nothing except for the length of the plaintexts and cannot
replace m with another plaintext. Also, for a positive integer t, we write ( s−→ s)t for the composition of invoked t secure
channels s−→ s‖ s−→ s‖ · · · ‖ s−→ s (t times).
• Key Sharing Resource (with Uniform Distribution): A key sharing resource with the uniform distribution usable once,
denoted by s s, means the ideal resource with no input which generates a uniform random string k and outputs it at
both interfaces of Alice and Bob. Even if Eve is active, her interface outputs no information on k and cannot replace k
with another one. More generally, if such a key k is chosen according to a distribution PK (not necessarily the uniform
distribution), we denote the key sharing resource by [PK].
• Correlated Randomness Resource (or Key Distribution Resource): Let PXY be a probability distribution with random
variables X and Y . A correlated randomness resource usable once, denoted by [PXY ], means the resource with no input
which randomly generates (x, y) according to the distribution PXY and outputs x and y at interfaces of Alice and Bob,
respectively. Even if Eve is active, her interface outputs no information on (x, y) and cannot replace it with another one.
Note that the resource [PXY ] includes [PK] (and hence s s ) as a special case.
III. SYMMETRIC-KEY ENCRYPTION: PROTOCOL EXECUTION AND SECURITY FORMALIZATIONS, REVISITED
We explain the traditional protocol execution of symmetric-key encryption. In the following, let M and C be finite sets
of plaintexts and ciphertexts, respectively. In addition, let M and C be andom variables which take plaintexts in M and
ciphertexts in C, respectively.
Let π = (πAenc, πBdec) be a symmetric-key encryption protocol connected to a key sharing resource [PK] as defined below,
where πAenc is a converter called an encryption algorithm at Alice’s side, and πBdec is a converter called a decryption algorithm
at Bob’s side:
– Input of Alice’s outer interface: m ∈ M
– Input of Alice’s inner interface: k ∈ K by accessing [PK]
– Input of Bob’s inner interface: k ∈ K by accessing [PK]
– Output of Bob’s outer interface: m˜ ∈ M˜
1. πAenc computes c = πAenc(k,m) and sends c to πBenc by s−→ .
2. πBdec computes m˜ = πBdec(k, c) and outputs m˜.
5In this paper, for given random variables M and K , let M˜ := πBdec(K,πAenc(K,M)) be a random variable which takes
values in the set of output of πBdec.
Note that we do not require any restriction on the protocol execution of symmetric-key encryption such as: πAenc is
deterministic; or for each k ∈ K, πAenc(k, ·) : M → C is injective; or πBdec is deterministic; or it has to be satisfied that
πBdec(k, π
A
enc(k,m)) = m for any possible k and m. Therefore, we deal with a general case of the protocol execution of
symmetric-key encryption. In particular, it should be noted that: πAenc can be probabilistic (i.e., not necessarily deterministic);
for each k ∈ K, πAenc(k, ·) may not be injective; πBdec can be probabilistic; and a decryption-error may occur.
If a symmetric-key encryption protocol π is usable at most one time (i.e., the one-time model), the purpose of π is to
transform the resources [PK ] and s−→ into the secure channel s−→ s . In this paper, we only deal with symmetric-key
encryption protocols in the one-time model, since this model is simple and fundamental.
Now, we revisit the formalization of several information-theoretic security notions for symmetric-key encryption. The
traditional security is formalized based on the notion that the observed ciphertext C and underlying plaintext M are statistically
independent. The most famous formalization based on this notion is Shannon’s perfect secrecy [30], H(M |C) = H(M), or
equivalently, I(M ;C) = 0. As an extended (or a relaxed) version, we can also consider its variant, I(M ;C) ≤ ǫ for some
small quantity ǫ. Along with this concept, we first consider the following two definitions.
Definition 2: Let π be a symmetric-key encryption protocol. Let PM be a certain probability distribution on M. Then, π is
said to be ǫ-secure for PM if it satisfies the following conditions:
(i) Correctness Pr{M 6= M˜} ≤ ǫ; and
(ii) Secrecy I(M ;C) ≤ ǫ.
In particular, π is said to be perfectly-secure for PM if ǫ = 0 above for PM .
Definition 3: Let π be a symmetric-key encryption protocol. Then, π is said to be ǫ-secure, if for any probability distribution
PM ∈ P(M), we have:
(i) Correctness Pr{M 6= M˜} ≤ ǫ; and
(ii) Secrecy I(M ;C) ≤ ǫ.
In particular, π is said to be perfectly-secure if ǫ = 0 above.
The difference of Definitions 2 and 3 is that we consider security only for a certain distribution of plaintexts or for all
distributions of plaintexts. Obviously, Definition 3 is stronger than Definition 2, since we can find a distribution PM and π
such that π is ǫ-secure for PM but it is not ǫ-secure. In this paper, we are interested in correctness and security of Definition
3 or other formalizations in which all distributions of plaintexts are considered. From this viewpoint, we give the following
definition in a comprehensive way.
Definition 4 (Correctness and Security): Let π be a symmetric-key encryption protocol. Then, π is said to be (δ, ǫ)-secure
in the sense of Type (i, j), if π satisfies
δπ,i ≤ δ and ǫπ,j ≤ ǫ,
where δπ,i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) and ǫπ,j (1 ≤ j ≤ 10) are defined as follows.
• Correctness. We define the following parameters concerning correctness of π:
δπ,1 := sup
PM
Pr{M 6= M˜},
δπ,2 := sup
PM
∆(PMM˜ , PMM ),
δπ,3 := max
m
∆(PM˜ |M=m, PM|M=m),
where the supremum ranges over all PM ∈ P(M).
• Traditional Secrecy (TS). We define the following advantage of adversaries in terms of traditional secrecy:
ǫπ,1 := sup
PM
I(M ;C),
ǫπ,2 := sup
PM
∆(PMC , PMPC),
ǫπ,3 := sup
PM
max
m∈M
∆(PC|M=m, PC),
ǫπ,4 := sup
PM
max
c∈C
∆(PM|C=c, PM ).
6• Indistinguishability (IND). We define the following advantage of adversaries in terms of indistinguishability:
ǫπ,5 := max
m
max
m′ 6=m
∆(PC|M=m, PC|M=m′),
ǫπ,6 := max
m
max
m′ 6=m
max
f :C→{0,1}
|Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m} − Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m′}| ,
where in ǫπ,6 the maximum ranges over all functions f : C → {0, 1}.
• Semantic Security (SS). We define the following advantage of adversaries in terms of semantic security:
ǫπ,7 := sup
PM
max
f :C→{0,1}
inf
Gf
max
h:M→{0,1}
|Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − Pr{Gf = h(M)}| , (1)
where the maximum ranges over all functions f : C → {0, 1} and h : M → {0, 1}, and the infimum ranges over all
binary random variable Gf which only depends on f but is independent of PM and h.
• Composable Security (CS). We define the following advantage of adversaries in terms of composable security:
ǫπ,8 := inf
σ
∆D(π( s−→|| [PK ]), σ( s−→ s)) (2)
= inf
PQ
sup
PM
∆(PMM˜C , PMMPQ), (3)
ǫπ,9 := inf
PQ
sup
PM
∆(PMC , PMPQ), (4)
ǫπ,10 := inf
PQ
max
m
∆(PC|M=m, PQ), (5)
where the infimum in (2) ranges over all possible simulators, the supremum in (3), (4) ranges over all PM ∈ P(M), and
the infimum in (3)–(5) ranges over all PQ ∈ P(C).
By Definition 4, we can formally give thirty kinds of formalizations of correctness and security. In particular, several
important formalizations known can be considered to be captured within Definition 4 as follows.
• Traditional Secrecy (TS). The traditional formalization in Definition 3 corresponds to the security in the sense of Type
(1, 1). Note that, instead of using the mutual information, independence of M and C is expressed by the statistical distance
as ∆(PMC , PMPC) = 0, and can be relaxed as ∆(PMC , PMPC) ≤ ǫ. This type of security is represented by Type (1, 2).
• Indistinguishability (IND). The formalization based on information-theoretic analogue of indistinguishability by Gold-
wasser and Micali [15] corresponds to the security in the sense of Type (1, 5), since ǫπ,5 means the adversary’s advantage
for distinguishing the views (i.e., distributions of ciphertexts) in the protocol execution when two different plaintexts are
inputted. In addition, ǫπ,6 means another interpretation of information-theoretic indistinguishability, since the adversary’s
advantage for distinguishing the views is described by the use of a binary function f arbitrarily chosen by the adversary.
In this case, the security is represented by Type (1, 6).
• Semantic Security (SS). The formalization based on information-theoretic analogue of semantic security by Goldwasser
and Micali [15] corresponds to the security in the sense of Type (1, 7) by the following reason: Intuitively, semantic
security implies that a ciphertext C is almost useless to obtain any one bit information of the underlying plaintext M ;
and the adversary’s advantage ǫπ,7 implies that, in order to guess such one bit information h(M), there is no difference
between by using the ciphertext C and a mapping f , and by using f only with a random coin.
• Composable Security (CS). The formalizations based on information-theoretic composable security given by Definition
1 is the security in the sense of Type (2, 8) or Type (3, 8). In addition, we can consider the distinguisher’s advantage
by the following his behavier: a distinguisher arbitrarily chooses a random variable M (or a plaintext m) and inputs it
into A-interface; then, δπ,2 (or δπ,3) means the distinguisher’s advantage for distinguishing real output and ideal one at
B-interface; and ǫπ,9 (or ǫπ,10) means his advantage for distinguishing real output and simulator’s output (according to
PQ) at E-interface. By combining those, we will reach the security of Type (i, j) with i = 2, 3 and j = 9, 10 for the
composable security.
We next define equivalence of security notions of Type (i, j) as follows.
Definition 5: For a symmetric-key encryption protocol π, its security of Type (i, j) and Type (i′, j′) are said to be strictly
equivalent, if δπ,i = Θ(δπ,i′) and ǫπ,j = Θ(ǫπ,j′) where Θ(·) is evaluated in a system parameter κ ∈ N inputted into π
and [PK]. Furthermore, for a symmetric-key encryption protocol π, its security of Type (i, j) and Type (i′, j′) are said to be
equivalent, if it holds that
(δπ,i, ǫπ,j)→ (0, 0) (as κ→∞) if and only if (δπ,i′ , ǫπ,j′)→ (0, 0) (as κ→∞).
In Section IV, we will show equivalence and non-equivalence between the formalizations in a comprehensive way.
7IV. SYMMETRIC-KEY ENCRYPTION: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FORMALIZATIONS OF CORRECTNESS AND SECURITY
A. Equivalence
We show the explicit relationships between security formalizations of Type (i, j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 10. In the
following, let Π be a family of all symmetric-key encryption protocols.
Theorem 1: For any symmetric-key encryption protocol π ∈ Π, we have explicit relationships between formalizations of
correctness and security as follows.
1) Correctness formalizations: δπ,1 = δπ,2 = δπ,3,
2) TS formalizations:
2
ln 2
ǫ2π,2 ≤ ǫπ,1 ≤ −2ǫπ,2 log
2ǫπ,2
|M| |C| , ǫ2,π ≤ ǫ3,π ≤ 2ǫ2,π, ǫ2,π ≤ ǫ4,π,
3) IND formalizations: ǫ5,π = ǫ6,π,
4) CS formalizations: max(ǫπ,9, δπ,2) ≤ ǫπ,8 ≤ ǫπ,9 + δπ,2, ǫ9,π = ǫ10,π,
5) TS and IND: ǫ3,π = ǫ5,π,
6) SS and IND: ǫπ,7 ≤ ǫπ,6 ≤ 4ǫπ,7,
7) IND, CS, and TS: 12ǫ2,π ≤ ǫ9,π ≤ ǫ5,π.
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is organized as follows:
1) Proof of relationships between correctness formalizations is given by Lemma 1,
2) Proof of relationships between TS formalizations is given by Lemmas 2 and 9,
3) Proof of relationships between IND formalizations is given by Lemma 3,
4) Proof of relationships between CS formalizations is given by Lemmas 4 and 5,
5) Proof of relationships between TS and IND is given by Lemma 6,
6) Proof of relationships between SS and IND is given by Lemma 7,
7) Proof of relationships among IND, CS, and TS is given by Lemma 8.
In the following, we will show Lemmas 1–9 to complete the proof.
Lemma 1: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have δπ,1 = δπ,2 = δπ,3.
Proof: First, we show δπ,1 = δπ,2: For any π and for any distribution PM , we have ∆(PMM , PMM˜ ) = P (M 6= M˜) by
Proposition 9 in Appendix A, from which it is straightforward to have δπ,1 = δπ,2.
Secondly, we show δπ,2 = δπ,3: This is shown by applying X = Y = M and Z = M˜ in Proposition 12 in Appendix B.
Lemma 2: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have
2
ln 2
ǫ2π,2 ≤ ǫπ,1 ≤ −2ǫπ,2 log
2ǫπ,2
|M| |C| ,
ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,3, and ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,4.
Proof: First, we show that 2ln 2ǫ2π,2 ≤ ǫπ,1 ≤ −2ǫπ,2 log 2ǫpi,2|M| |C| : From Corollary 7 in Appendix A, it follows that, for any
PM and any π,
I(M ;C) ≤ −2∆(PMC , PMPC) log 2∆(PMC , PMPC)|M| · |C|
≤ −2ǫπ,2 log 2ǫπ,2|M| · |C| .
Therefore, we have
ǫπ,1 ≤ −2ǫπ,2 log 2ǫπ,2|M| · |C| .
On the other hand, from Corollary 6 in Appendix A, it follows that, for any PM and any π,
∆(PMC , PMPC) ≤
√
ln 2
2
I(M ;C)
1
2 .
Therefore, we have ǫπ,2 ≤
√
ln 2
2 ǫ
1
2
π,1.
Secondly, we show ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,3: For an arbitrary distribution PM , we have
∆(PMC , PMPC) =
1
2
∑
m,c
|PMC(m, c)− PM (m)PC(c)|
=
1
2
∑
m
PM (m)
∑
c
|PC|M=m(c|m)− PC(c)|
8≤ 1
2
max
m
∑
c
|PC|M=m(c|m)− PC(c)|
= max
m
∆(PC|M=m, PC).
Therefore, we get ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,3.
Similarly, we can show that, for an arbitrary distribution PM ,
∆(PMC , PMPC) ≤ max
c
∆(PM|C=c, PM ),
which implies that ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,4.
Lemma 3: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have ǫπ,5 = ǫπ,6.
Proof: For probability distributions PX and PY over a finite set X , it holds that
∆(PX , PY ) = max
f :X→{0,1}
|Pr{f(X) = 1} − Pr{f(Y ) = 1}| .
Thus, we have
max
m,m′
∆(PC|M=m, PC|M=m′) = max
m,m′
max
f :C→{0,1}
|Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m} − Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m′}| ,
which implies ǫπ,5 = ǫπ,6.
Lemma 4: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have
max(ǫπ,9, δπ,2) ≤ ǫπ,8 ≤ ǫπ,9 + δπ,2.
Proof: For any distributions PM ∈ P(M) and PQ ∈ P(C), we have
∆(PMM˜C , PMMPQ) ≤ ∆(PMM˜C , PMMC) + ∆(PMMC , PMMPQ)
= ∆(PMM˜ , PMM ) + ∆(PMC , PMPQ).
By taking the supremum over all PM ∈ P(M) and the infimum over all PQ ∈ P(C), we have
inf
PQ
sup
PM
∆(PMM˜C , PMMPQ) ≤ sup
PM
∆(PMM˜ , PMM ) + infPQ
sup
PM
∆(PMC , PMPQ)
= δπ,2 + ǫπ,9.
In addition, from Proposition 8 in Appendix A, it is clear that ∆(PMC , PMPQ) ≤ ∆(PMM˜C , PMMPQ) for any PM ∈ P(M)
and PQ ∈ P(C). Therefore, we obtain
ǫπ,9 ≤ inf
PQ
sup
PM
∆(PMM˜C , PMMPQ).
Similarly, we have δπ,2 ≤ infPQ supPM ∆(PMM˜C , PMMPQ).
Lemma 5: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have ǫπ,9 = ǫπ,10.
Proof: For arbitrary distributions PQ and PM , we set X := M , Y := C, and Z := Q, and use Proposition 12 in Appendix
B. Then, we have supPM ∆(PMC , PMPQ) = maxm∆(PC|M=m, PQ). Therefore, by taking the infimum over all PQ ∈ P(C),
we have ǫπ,9 = ǫπ,10.
Lemma 6: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have ǫπ,3 = ǫπ,5.
Proof: Observe for every m ∈M that
∆
(
PC|M=m, PC
)
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣∣PC|M (c|m)−
∑
m′∈M
PC|M (c|m′)PM (m′)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′)
{
PC|M (c|m)− PC|M (c|m′)
}∣∣∣∣∣ . (6)
First, we prove ǫπ,3 ≤ ǫπ,5: For arbitrary PM , let m0 := argmaxm∆(PC|M=m, PC). Then, from (6) we have
max
m
∆(PC|M=m, PC) = ∆
(
PC|M=m0 , PC
)
≤ 1
2
∑
m1∈M
PM (m1)
∑
c∈C
∣∣PC|M (c|m0)− PC|M (c|m1)∣∣
=
∑
m1∈M
PM (m1) ·∆
(
PC|M=m0 , PC|M=m1
)
9≤
∑
m1∈M
PM (m1)ǫπ,5
= ǫπ,5. (7)
Hence, by taking the supremum over all PM ∈ P(M), we get ǫπ,3 ≤ ǫπ,5.
Next, we show ǫπ,3 ≥ ǫπ,5: Let m0,m1 ∈M such that ǫπ,5 = ∆(PC|M=m0 , PC|M=m1). For arbitrary ǫ > 0, we define
PM (m
′) =
{
1− γ, if m′ = m1
γ
|M|−1 , otherwise
(8)
where γ is a positive real number such that γǫπ,5 ≤ ǫ. Then, by substituting both m = m0 and PM (m′) into (6), we obtain
ǫπ,3 ≥ ∆(PC|M=m0 , PC)
=
1
2
∑
c∈C
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m′∈M
PM (m
′)
{
PC|M (c|m0)− PC|M (c|m′)
}∣∣∣∣∣
≥ 1
2
∑
c∈C
∣∣(1− γ){PC|M (c|m0)− PC|M (c|m1)}∣∣
= (1− γ)ǫπ,5
≥ ǫπ,5 − ǫ.
Lemma 7: For any symmetric key encryption π, we have
ǫπ,7 ≤ ǫπ,6 ≤ 4ǫπ,7.
Proof: First, we prove ǫπ,7 ≤ ǫπ,6. This part of the proof can be shown in a very similar way as that in [33] as
follows, though the proof in [33] is given under computational security setting. Suppose that a distribution PM and functions
f : C → {0, 1}, h :M→ {0, 1} are arbitrarily given. Let PM∗ be an independently and identically distribution of PM . Then,
we consider the random variable Gf which is defined by
Gf := f(C
∗), and PC∗(c) :=
∑
m1
PC|M (c|m1)PM∗(m1) for c ∈ C and m1 ∈M.
Let us define an indicator function 1f,h : C ×M→ {0, 1} for maps f and h by
1f,h(c,m) =
{
1, if f(c) = h(m)
0, otherwise. (9)
Then, we have
inf
G
fˆ
∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − Pr{Gfˆ = h(M)}∣∣∣
≤ |Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − Pr{Gf = h(M)}|
= |Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − Pr{f(C∗) = h(M)}|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c,m0
1f,h(c,m0) {PCM (c,m0)− PC∗M (c,m0)}
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c,m0
1f,h(c,m0)PM (m0)
{
PC|M (c|m0)− PC∗(c)
}∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m0,m1
PM (m0)PM∗(m1)
∑
c
1f,h(c,m0){PC|M (c|m0)− PC|M (c|m1)}
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
m0,m1
PM (m0)PM∗(m1) {Pr{fh,m0(C) = 1|M = m0} − Pr{fh,m0(C) = 1|M = m1}}
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
m0,m1
PM (m0)PM∗(m1)ǫπ,6
= ǫπ,6,
where fh,m0 : C → {0, 1} is defined by fh,m0(c) = 1 if and only if 1f,h(c,m0) = 1. Therefore, we have ǫπ,7 ≤ ǫπ,6.
Next, we show that ǫπ,6 ≤ 4ǫπ,7. We first prove the following claim.
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Claim 1: For arbitrarily given PM , f : C → {0, 1}, and h :M→ {0, 1}, we have∣∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − ∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f(C) = ℓ}Pr{h(M) = ℓ}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ǫπ,7. (10)
Proof: Suppose that PM and f : C → {0, 1} are arbitrarily given. Then, by definition of semantic security, there exists
Gf such that ∣∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − Pr{Gf = h(M)}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫπ,7 (11)
for any h :M→ {0, 1}. In particular, letting h be a map that always outputs 1 for every m ∈ M, we have∣∣Pr{f(C) = 1} − Pr{Gf = 1}∣∣ ≤ ǫπ,7
which is equivalent to ∣∣Pr{f(C) = 0} − Pr{Gf = 0}∣∣ ≤ ǫπ,7.
Thus, for ℓ ∈ {0, 1}, it holds that
Pr{Gf = ℓ}+ ǫπ,7 ≥ Pr{f(C) = ℓ} ≥ Pr{Gf = ℓ} − ǫπ,7,
and hence we have
(Pr{Gf = ℓ}+ ǫπ,7) Pr{h(M) = ℓ} ≥ Pr{f(C) = ℓ}Pr{h(M) = ℓ} ≥ (Pr{Gf = ℓ} − ǫπ,7) Pr{h(M) = ℓ}.
From this, it follows that
Pr{Gf = h(M)}+ ǫπ,7 ≥
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f(C) = ℓ}Pr{h(M) = ℓ} ≥ Pr{Gf = h(M)} − ǫπ,7,
or equivalently, ∣∣∣∣ ∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f(C) = ℓ}Pr{h(M) = ℓ} − Pr{Gf = h(M)}
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫπ,7. (12)
Therefore, we obtain ∣∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − ∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f(C) = ℓ}Pr{h(M) = ℓ}
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M)} − Pr{Gf = h(M)}
∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣ ∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f(C) = ℓ}Pr{h(M) = ℓ} − Pr{Gf = h(M)}
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2ǫπ,7,
where the last inequality follows from (11) and (12).
By applying X = f(C) and Y = h(M) in Lemma 15 in Appendix B to the inequality (10), it holds that∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M) = 1} − Pr{f(C) = 1}Pr{h(M) = 1}∣∣∣ ≤ ǫπ,7, (13)
for arbitrarily given PM , f : C → {0, 1}, and h :M→ {0, 1}. In particular, we choose m0,m1 ∈M by which ǫπ,6 is given.
Then, for arbitrary ǫ > 0, we consider
PM (m) :=


1
2 , if m = m0,
1
2 − γ, if m = m1,
γ
|M|−2 , otherwise,
where γ is a positive real number with γǫπ,6 ≤ 2ǫ, and take h :M→ {0, 1} defined by
h(m) :=
{
1, if m = m0,
0, otherwise.
Then, from (13) it follows that
ǫπ,7 ≥
∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = h(M) = 1} − Pr{f(C) = 1}Pr{h(M) = 1}∣∣∣
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= Pr{M = m0}
∣∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m0} − ∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = mℓ}Pr{M = mℓ}
∣∣∣∣
= Pr{M = m0}Pr{M = m1}
∣∣∣∣Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m0} − Pr{f(C) = 1 |M = m1}
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
(
1
2
− γ
)
ǫπ,6
≥ 1
4
ǫπ,6 − ǫ.
Lemma 8: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have 12ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,9 ≤ ǫπ,5.
Proof: First, we show 12ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,9: For arbitrary distributions PQ and PM , we have
∆(PMC , PMPC) ≤ ∆(PMC , PMPQ) + ∆(PMPQ, PMPC)
= ∆(PMC , PMPQ) + ∆(PQ, PC)
≤ 2∆(PMC , PMPQ).
Therefore, ǫπ,2 ≤ 2απ,9.
Next, we show ǫπ,9 ≤ ǫπ,5: By Lemma 5, it is sufficient to prove ǫπ,10 ≤ ǫπ,5. Let m0 ∈ M be a plaintext such that it
gives ǫπ,10, and set PQ := PC|M=m1 by choosing m1 ∈M with m1 6= m0. Then, we have
ǫπ,10 ≤ ∆(PC|M=m0 , PQ) = ∆(PC|M=m0 , PC|M=m1) ≤ ǫπ,5.
Lemma 9: For any symmetric-key encryption π, we have ǫπ,3 ≤ 2ǫπ,2.
Proof: By Lemma 6, it is sufficient to prove ǫπ,5 ≤ 2ǫπ,2. For any ǫ > 0, and for m0,m1 ∈ M (m0 6= m1) such that
ǫπ,5 = ∆(PC|M=m0 , PC|M=m1), we define a distribution PMˆ by
PMˆ (m) :=
{ 1
2 (1 − γ) if m ∈ {m0,m1},
γ
|M|−2 otherwise,
where γ is a positive real number such that γǫπ,5 ≤ 2ǫ. Then, we have
ǫπ,2 ≥ ∆(PMˆCˆ , PMˆPCˆ)
≥ 1
2
(1− γ){∆(PCˆ|Mˆ=m0 , PCˆ) + ∆(PCˆ|Mˆ=m1 , PCˆ)}
≥ 1
2
(1− γ)∆(PCˆ|Mˆ=m0 , PCˆ|Mˆ=m1)
=
1
2
(1− γ)απ,5
≥ 1
2
ǫπ,5 − ǫ.
The following theorem shows equivalence between security formalizations of Type (i, j) under a certain condition.
Theorem 2: For security formalizations of Type (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ 3 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 10, we have the following relationships:
(i) For arbitrary symmetric-key encryption protocol π ∈ Π, all π’s security of Type (i, j) are strictly equivalent except for
j = 1, 4.
(ii) Let Π1 = {π ∈ Π | ǫπ,5 = o(1/ log |M|) and ǫπ,5 = o(1/ log |C|)}. Then, for arbitrary π ∈ Π1, all π’s security of Type
(i, j) are equivalent except for j = 4.
(iii) Let Π2 = {π ∈ Π | |C| = Θ(|M|), δπ,1 = o(1/ log |M|), ǫπ,5 = o(1/|M|)}. Then, for arbitrary π ∈ Π2, all π’s
security of Type (i, j) are equivalent.
Proof: First, the proof of (i) directly follows from Theorem 1.
Next, we prove (ii). By Theorem 1, we have
ǫπ,1 ≤ −2ǫπ,2 log 2ǫπ,2|M| |C| , and ǫπ,2 = Θ(ǫπ,5). (14)
Now, we consider the following proposition.
Lemma 10: Let y(x) be a continuous and positive function defined over (0,∞), and define the function f(x) = −x log xy(x) .
Then, it holds that f(x)→ 0 as x→ 0 if and only if y(x) = 2o(1/x).
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Proof: Note that f(x) = −x log x+ x log y(x) and −x log x→ 0 as x→ 0. Therefore, we have f(x)→ 0 if and only if
x log y(x)→ 0, or equivalently, y(x) = 2o(1/x).
Therefore, by Lemma 10 and (14), we have ǫπ,1 = o(1) under the condition |M| · |C| = 2o(1/ǫpi,5), which in turn follows
from the condition that ǫπ,5 = o(1/ log |M|) and ǫπ,5 = o(1/ log |C|).
Finally, in order to prove (iii), we need the following propositions.
Lemma 11: Let ǫ˜π,4 := sup
PM
max
c0,c1
∆(PM|C=c0 , PM|C=c1). Then, we have ǫ˜π,4 = ǫπ,4.
Proof: The proof is shown in the same way as that of ǫπ,3 = ǫπ,5 in Lemma 6.
Lemma 12: For any symmetric-key encryption π, it holds that
ǫ˜π,4 ≤ 2ǫπ,3
(
sup
PM
PC(cmin)
−1
)
,
where cmin := arg min
c∈Supp(PC)
PC(c).
Proof: For any PM , m ∈ Supp(PM ), and c ∈ Supp(PC), we have |PC(c)− PC|M (c|m)| ≤ ǫπ,3, which is equivalent to
1− ǫπ,3
PC(c)
≤ PC|M (c|m)
PC(c)
≤ 1 + ǫπ,3
PC(c)
. (15)
For any PM , and c0, c1 ∈ Supp(PC), it holds that
∆(PM|C=c0 , PM|C=c1) =
∑
m
|PM|C(m|c0)− PM|C(m|c1)|
=
∑
m
PM (m)
∣∣∣∣PC|M (c0|m)PC(c0) −
PC|M (c1|m)
PC(c1)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
m
PM (m) max
c∈Supp(PC)
2ǫπ,3
PC(c)
(16)
= max
c∈Supp(PC)
2ǫπ,3
PC(c)
=
2ǫπ,3
PC(cmin)
, (17)
where cmin := arg min
c∈Supp(PC)
PC(c) and the inequality (16) follows from (15). By taking the supremum over PM ∈ P(M),
the inequality in the lemma is induced.
Proposition 2: For a symmetric-key encryption π, it holds that
ǫπ,4 ≤ 2ǫπ,3 · |C|
1−√2 ln 2 [log |C| − (1− δπ,1) log |M|+ h(δπ,1)]
1
2
.
Proof: First, we have the inequality
H(M) = H(M | K) ≤ H(M,C | K) = H(C | K) +H(M | K,C)
≤ H(C) +H(M | M˜)
≤ H(C) + Pr{M 6= M˜} log(|M| − 1) + h(Pr{M 6= M˜}) (18)
≤ H(C) + δπ,1 log |M|+ h(δπ,1), (19)
where the inequality (18) follows from Fano’s inequality.
For the case of uniform distribution PM over M, we have
D(PC ‖ PU ) = log |C| −H(C)
≤ log |C| −H(M) + δπ,1 log |M|+ h(δπ,1) (20)
= log |C| − log |M|+ δπ,1 log |M|+ h(δπ,1)
= log |C| − (1 − δπ,1) log |M|+ h(δπ,1), (21)
where (20) follows from (19). Let η := log |C| − (1− δπ,1) log |M|+ h(δπ,1). Then, we have
∆(PC , PU ) ≤
√
ln 2
2
D(PC ‖ PU ) 12 ≤
√
ln 2
2
η
1
2 ,
and hence, we get √
ln 2
2
η
1
2 ≥ 1
2
∑
c
∣∣∣∣PC(c)− 1|C|
∣∣∣∣
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≥ 1
2
|C|
(
1
|C| − PC(cmin)
)
.
Therefore, we have
PC(cmin)
−1 ≤ |C|
1−√2 ln 2 η 12 .
From the above inequality and Lemmas 11 and 12, it follows that
ǫπ,4 = ǫ˜π,4
≤ 2ǫπ,3
(
sup
PM
PC(cmin)
−1
)
≤ 2ǫπ,3 · |C|
1−√2 ln 2 η 12
=
2ǫπ,3 · |C|
1−√2 ln 2 [log |C| − (1− δπ,1) log |M|+ h(δπ,1)]
1
2
.
We are back to the proof of Theorem 2. From the assumptions, |C| = Θ(|M|) and δπ,1 = o(1/ log |M|), and Proposition
2, it follows that ǫπ,4 = O(ǫπ,3 · |M|). Here, we note that ǫπ,3 = Θ(ǫπ,5) by Theorem 1. Therefore, by the assumption of
ǫπ,5 = o(1/|M|), we have ǫπ,4 = o(1).
B. Non-equivalence
Let π be a symmetric key encryption. We denote by PπC|M an |C| × |M| transition probability matrix associated with
{PC|M (c|m)}c∈C,m∈M of π, i.e., each entry of PπC|M corresponds to PC|M (c|m) for c ∈ C and m ∈M in π.
The following theorem states the property of PπC|M for a symmetric key encryption π.
Theorem 3: For any symmetric key encryption π satisfying |C| = |M|, its probability transition matrix PπC|M is doubly
stochastic1. Conversely, for any n × n matrix A which is doubly stochastic, there exists a symmetric-key encryption π such
that |C| = |M| = n and PπC|M = A.
Proof: In what follows, we consider the case of |M| = |C|. In this case, if k ∈ K is fixed, there exists a bijection
fk :M→ C since every ciphertext c ∈ C can be uniquely decrypted by k ∈ K. Hence, for each k ∈ K, let Fk ∈ {0, 1}n×n be
a permutation matrix which corresponds to the bijection fk. Then, it is easy to see that the probability transition matrix can
be represented as
P
π
C|M =
∑
k∈K
PK(k)Fk, (22)
which is doubly stochastic. Conversely, due to Birknoff–von Neumann Theorem, there exists a pair of PK(k) and Fk, k ∈ K,
satisfying (22) if PπC|M is doubly stochastic.
In the following, let Π¯ := {π ∈ Π | |C| = Θ(|M|) and δπ,1 = o(1/ log |M|)}. The following theorems show the explicit
conditions for non-equivalence between security formalizations.
Theorem 4: For arbitrary π ∈ Π¯, if security of Type (i, 1) and Type (i, 5) are not equivalent (i.e., security of Type (i, 1)
is asymptotically stronger than that of Type (i, 5)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have ǫπ,5 = Ω(1/ log |M|). Conversely, for arbitrarily
given ǫ such that ǫ = o(1) and ǫ = Ω(1/ logn), there exists a symmetric-key encryption π ∈ Π¯ such that, ǫπ,5 = ǫ, n = |M|,
and π’s security of Type (i, 1) and Type (i, 5) are not equivalent for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Proof: We show the first statement of Theorem 4 by its contraposition, namely, we prove that ǫπ,1 = o(1) for arbitrarily
given π ∈ Π¯ satisfying ǫπ,5 = o(1/ logn). This statement directly follows from (ii) of Theorem 2.
What remains to be shown is the second statement of Theorem 4, and it is sufficient to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Suppose that ǫ = o(1) and ǫ = Ω(1/ logn). Then, there exists a symmetric-key encryption π ∈ Π¯ such that,
ǫπ,5 = ǫ, n = |M|, and π’s security of Type (i, 1) and Type (i, 5) are not equivalent for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Proof: For arbitarary ǫ and any positive integer n, we consider an n× n matrix A = (aij) defined by
aij =
{
ǫ+ 1−ǫn if i = j,
1−ǫ
n otherwise.
(23)
1An n× n probability transition matrix P = (pi,j) is said to be doubly stochastic if
∑
i pi,j =
∑
j pi,j = 1 for every 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
14
Then, it holds that
∑
j aij = 1 for every i, and
∑
i aij = 1 for every j, which shows that A is doubly stochastic. Therefore, by
Theorem 3, it follows that there exists a symmetric-key encryption π such that |M| = |C| = n and PπC|M = A, where PπC|M
is the probability transition matrix of π. Suppose that M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}, C = {c1, c2, . . . , cn}, and the (i, j)-entry of
P
π
C|M is equal to PC|M (ci|mj).
It is easy to see that ∆(PC|M=mi , PC|M=mj ) = ǫ for every pair of mi,mj ∈ M with mi 6= mj . Hence, we have ǫπ,5 = ǫ,
and by taking ǫ→ 0 it holds that
lim
ǫ→0
ǫπ,5 = 0. (24)
On the other hand, if we assume that PM is the uniform distribution, it holds that by direct calculation
I(M ;C) =
(
ǫ+
1
n
)
log n+
(
ǫ+
1− ǫ
n
)
log
(
ǫ+
1− ǫ
n
)
+
(
1− 1
n
)
(1− ǫ) log (1− ǫ)− ǫ
n
logn. (25)
Thus, by setting ǫ = 1logn and taking n→∞ in (25), we have limn→∞ I(M ;C) = 1, and hence,
lim
ǫ→0
ǫπ,1 ≥ 1. (26)
Therefore, the proof is completed by (24) and (26).
Theorem 5: For arbitrary π ∈ Π¯, if security of Type (i, 4) and Type (i, 5) are not equivalent (i.e., security of Type (i, 4) is
asymptotically stronger than that of Type (i, 5)) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, we have ǫπ,5 = Ω(1/|M|). Conversely, for arbitrarily given ǫ
such that ǫ = o(1) and ǫ = Ω(1/n), there exists a symmetric-key encryption π ∈ Π¯ such that, ǫπ,5 = ǫ, n = |M|, and π’s
security of Type (i, 4) and Type (i, 5) are not equivalent for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Proof: The contraposition of the first statement of Theorem 5 follows from (iii) of Theorem 2.
In order to show the second statement of Theorem 5, it is sufficient to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose that ǫ = o(1) and ǫ = Ω(1/n). Then, there exists a symmetric-key encryption π ∈ Π¯ such that,
ǫπ,5 = ǫ, n = |M|, and π’s security of Type (i, 4) and Type (i, 5) are not equivalent for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Proof: We consider a symmetric-key encryption π ∈ Π¯ whose probability transition matrix is defined by (23) in the proof
of Proposition 3. Then, we have ǫπ,5 = ǫ and lim
ǫ→0
ǫπ,5 = 0 by (24).
On the other hand, we derive a lower bound on ǫπ,4 as follows. For any distribution PM , we have
PM|C(mi|cj) =
{
PM (mi)[ǫn+(1−ǫ)]
PM (mi)ǫn+(1−ǫ)
if i = j,
PM (mi)(1−ǫ)
PM (mj)ǫn+(1−ǫ)
if i 6= j.
Hence, for cs, ct ∈ C with s 6= t and PM (ms) ≤ PM (mt), we have
∆(PM|C=cs , PM|C=ct) =
PM (ms)PM (mt)ǫ
2n2 + PM (mt)ǫn(1− ǫ)(1 − PM (mt) + PM (ms))
[PM (ms)ǫn+ (1− ǫ)] [PM (mt)ǫn+ (1− ǫ)] .
In particular, for the case of a distribution PM with PM (ms) = PM (mt) = 1/3 and ǫ = 1/n, it holds that
∆(PM|C=cs , PM|C=ct) =
1
4− 3n
. (27)
Thus, we have
ǫπ,4 = sup
PM
max
cs,ct
∆(PM|C=cs , PM|C=ct) (28)
≥ 1
4− 3n
, (29)
where (28) and (29) follows from Lemma 11 and (27), respectively. Therefore, we obtain lim
ǫ→0
ǫπ,4 ≥ 1/4.
From the above discussion, it follows that lim
ǫ→0
ǫπ,4 ≥ 1/4 and lim
ǫ→0
ǫπ,5 = 0, and the proof is completed.
C. Lower Bounds and Impossibility Results
In this section, under each of the security formalizations in Definition 4, we derive lower bounds on the adversary’s (or
distinguisher’s) advantage and the required size of secret-keys. First, we note the following lower bound shown in [28].
Proposition 5 ([28]): Let π be a symmetric-key encryption protocol. Then, for any simulator σ on C, and for the set of all
distinguishers D, we have
∆D(π( s−→|| [PK ]), σ( s−→ s)) ≥ 1− |K||M| .
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In [28] Pope showed the above lower bound by only considering a distinguisher that inputs the uniformly distributed plaintexts
into the symmetric-key encryption protocol for distinguishing real output and ideal one. From the above proposition, it follows
that
ǫπ,8 ≥ 1− |K||M| , (30)
for arbitrary symmetric-key encryption π and [PK]. We now derive lower bounds for the adversary’s (or distinguisher’s)
advantage under all formalizations in Definition 4 at once through our relationships.
Theorem 6: For any symmetric-key encryption protocol π and [PK], we have:
(i) δπ,i + ǫπ,j ≥ 1− |K||M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10},
(ii) δπ,i + 2ǫπ,j ≥ 1− |K||M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {2, 4},
(iii) δπ,i + 4ǫπ,7 ≥ 1− |K||M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
(iv) δπ,i +
√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2
π,1 ≥ 1−
|K|
|M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
where δπ,i and ǫπ,j are parameters of formalizations of correctness and security, respectively, defined in Definition 4.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we have
ǫπ,8 ≤ ǫπ,9 + δπ,2,
δπ,1 = δπ,2 = δπ,3,
ǫπ,9 = ǫπ,10 ≤ ǫπ,3 = ǫπ,5 = ǫπ,6.
Combining the above inequalities with (30), we obtain (i).
In addition, by Theorem 1, we have ǫπ,3 ≤ 2ǫπ,2 and ǫπ,2 ≤ ǫπ,4. Therefore, we have (ii) by these inequalities and (i).
Similarly, the inequalities ǫπ,6 ≤ 4ǫπ,7 and ǫπ,2 ≤
√
ln 2
2 ǫ
1/2
π,1 shown by Theorem 1 imply (iii) and (iv), respectively, by
applying them to (i).
From Theorem 6, we obtain the following lower bounds on the size of secret-keys. The proof immediately follows from
Theorem 6, and we omit the proof.
Corollary 1: Suppose that a symmetric-key encryption protocol π is (δ, ǫ)-secure in the sense of Type (i, j). Then, we have
the following lower bounds on the size of secret-keys:
(i) |K| ≥ {1− (δ + ǫ)} |M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10},
(ii) |K| ≥ {1− (δ + 2ǫ)} |M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j ∈ {2, 4},
(iii) |K| ≥ {1− (δ + 4ǫ)} |M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j = 7,
(iv) |K| ≥
{
1−
(
δ +
√
2 ln 2ǫ
1
2
)}
|M| for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and j = 1.
Remark 1: As described in [32], it is known that: Let {Φr|r ∈ R} be a family of (hash) functions from S to T such that:
each Φr maps S injectively into T ; and there exists ǫ ∈ [0, 1] such that ∆(ΦH(s),ΦH(s′)) ≤ ǫ for all s, s′ ∈ S, where
H is uniformly distributed over R. Then, we have |R| ≥ (1 − ǫ)|S|. Corollary 1 can be understood as an extension of the
above statement (see (i) in Corollary 1). Actually, we do not necessarily assume that: PK is uniform; or for each k ∈ K,
πA(k, ·) :M→ C is deterministic and injective (Note that δ can be zero if πA(k, ·) is injective).
Remark 2: In [10], Dodis derives the lower bound (i) in Corollary 1, and shows that this bound is tight with respect to δ and
ǫ up to a constant. In fact, by using a mechanism of the one-time pad, two constructions satisfying the following parameters
are proposed in [10]: ǫ = 0 and |K| = (1− δ)|M| for given δ ∈ [0, 1]; and δ = 0 and |K| = (1− 12ǫ)|M| for given ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
such that ǫ · |M|/2 is non-negative integer. By the constructions, it is straightforwardly seen that our lower bounds in Corollary
1 are also tight with respect to δ and ǫ up to a constant.
By considering a contraposition of Corollary 1, we obtain the following impossibility result: There exists no symmetric-key
encryption protocol which is (δ, ǫ)-secure in the sense of Type (i, j), if δ and ǫ are some real numbers such that they do not
satisfy the corresponding inequality among (i)–(iv) in Corollary 1.
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V. KEY AGREEMENT
A. Protocol Execution
We explain protocol execution of key agreement. Let X and Y be finite sets. Suppose that Alice and Bob can have access
to an ideal resource, and that they can finally obtain x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , respectively. For simplicity, suppose that the resource
is given by a correlated randomness resource [PXY ]. In addition, we assume that there is the bidirectional (or unidirectional)
authenticated channel available between Alice and Bob, and that Eve can eavesdrop on all information transmitted by the
channel without any error.
Let K be a set of keys, and let K be a random variable which takes values on K in s s (or more generally, [PK]).
Also, let T be a set of transcripts between Alice and Bob. Let π = (πAka, πBka) be a key agreement protocol, where πAka (resp.
πBka) is a converter at Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) side, defined below: Let l be a positive integer and λ = 2l − 1; The converter
πAka consists of (probabilistic) functions f1, f3, f5, . . . , f2l−1 and gA, and the converter πBka consists of (probabilistic) functions
f2, f4, f6, . . . , f2l−2 and gB , where the functions f1, f2, . . . , fn, gA, gB are defined as follows:
fi : X × T i−1 → T , ti = fi(x, t1, t2, t3, . . . , ti−1) for i = 1, 3, . . . , 2l− 1;
fj : Y × T j−1 → T , tj = fj(y, t1, t2, t3, . . . , tj−1) for j = 2, 4, . . . , 2l − 2;
gA : X × T λ → K, kA = gA(x, t1, t2, t3, . . . , tλ); gB : Y × T λ → K, kB = gB(y, t1, t2, t3, . . . , tλ).
Key Agreement Protocol pi
Input of Alice’s inner interface: x ∈ X by accessing [PXY ]
Input of Bob’s inner interface: y ∈ Y by accessing [PXY ]
Output of Alice’s outer interface: kA ∈ K
Output of Bob’s outer interface: kB ∈ K
1. piA
ka
computes t1 = f1(x) and sends t1 to piBka by
s−→
.
2. For s from 1 to (λ− 1)/2,
2-1. piB
ka
computes t2s = f2s(y, t1, t2, . . . , t2s−1). Then, piBka sends t2s to pi
A
ka
by s←− .
2-2. piA
ka
computes t2s+1 = f2s+1(x, t1, t2, . . . , t2s). Then, piAka sends t2s+1 to piBka by
s−→
.
3. piA
ka
computes kA = gA(x, t1, t2, . . . , tλ) and outputs kA.
Similarly, piB
ka
computes kB = gB(y, t1, t2, . . . , tλ) and outputs kB .
Note that, if only the unidirectional authenticated channel from Alice to Bob is available, the functions fi for even i could
be understood as trivial functions which always return a certain single point (or symbol). Similarly, we can capture the case
of only the unidirectional authenticated channel from Bob to Alice being available.
For every i with 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, Ti denotes a random variable which takes values ti ∈ T , and let T λ := (T1, T2, . . . , Tλ) be
the joint random variable which takes values tλ = (t1, t2, . . . , tλ) ∈ T λ. Also, let KA and KB be the random variables which
take values kA ∈ K and kB ∈ K, respectively.
For simplicity, we assume that a key agreement protocol π can be used at most one time (i.e., we deal with key agreement
protocols in the one-time model). Therefore, the purpose of the key agreement protocol is to transform a correlated randomness
resource [PXY ] and channels ( s−→)l ‖ ( s←− )l−1 into a key sharing resource s s ( or more generally, [PK]).
B. Security Definitions Revisited: Formalizations and Relationships
As in the case of symmetric-key encryption protocols, let’s consider the following traditional formalization of security for
key agreement protocols (e.g. [8], [9], [12], [19], [20], [25]).
Definition 6: Let π be a key agreement protocol. Then, π is said to be ǫ-secure if it satisfies the following conditions:
Pr{KA 6= KB} ≤ ǫ, log |K| −H(KA) ≤ ǫ, and I(KA;T λ) ≤ ǫ.
In particular, π is said to be perfectly-secure if ǫ = 0 above.
We now consider the following formalizations of information-theoretic security for key agreement.
Definition 7: Let π be a key agreement protocol such that PK is the uniform distribution over K (i.e., [PK]= s s). We
define the following formalizations of correctness and security.
• Correctness. We define the following parameters concerning correctness of π:
δπ,1 := max{Pr{KA 6= KB}, log |K| −H(KA)},
δπ,2 := ∆(PKAKB , PKK).
• Security. We define the following advantage of adversaries for security:
ǫπ,1 := I(KA;T
λ),
ǫπ,2 := ∆(PKATλ , PKAPTλ),
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ǫπ,3 := inf
PQ
∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ),
where the infimum ranges over all PQ ∈ P(T λ).
Then, π is said to be (δ, ǫ)-secure in the sense of Type (i, j) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, if π satisfies δπ,i ≤ δ and
ǫπ,j ≤ ǫ.
The traditional definition in Definition 6 corresponds to the security in the sense of Type (1, 1). The composable security
by Maurer et al. [22], [24] and Canetti [5], [6] is closely related to the security in the sense of Type (2, 3): δπ,2 means
distinguisher’s advantage for distinguishing real output and ideal one at honest players’ interfaces, and δπ,2 is the same as the
formalization of availability in Definition 1 for key agreement; ǫπ,3 means distinguisher’s advantage for distinguishing real
transcripts and simulator’s output at E-interface, together with output at A-interface. Note that the formalization ǫπ,3 is simple,
and validity of ǫπ,3 is well explained by the following proposition.
Proposition 6: The formalization of security in Definition 1 for a key agreement protocol π is lower-and-upper bounded as
follows:
max
(
1
3
ǫπ,3, δπ,2
)
≤ inf
σ
∆D(π(( s−→)l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ]), σ( s s)) ≤ ǫπ,3 + 2δπ,2.
Proof: By focusing on distributions of output at A’s, B’s and E’s interfaces, for simplicity, we write
infPQ ∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ) for infσ ∆D(π(( s−→ )l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ]), σ( s s)), where PK is the uniform distribution
over K.
For any distribution PQ ∈ P(C), we have
∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ) ≤ ∆(PKAKBTλ , PKAKATλ) + ∆(PKAKATλ , PKAKAPQ)
+∆(PKAKAPQ, PKKPQ)
= Pr{KA 6= KB}+∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ) + ∆(PKA , PK)
≤ ∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ) + 2∆(PKAKB , PKK).
By taking the infimum over all PQ ∈ P(T λ), we have
inf
PQ
∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ) ≤ infPQ ∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ) + 2∆(PKAKB , PKK)
= ǫπ,3 + 2δπ,2.
In addition, for any distribution PQ ∈ P(C) we have
∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ) ≤ ∆(PKAKATλ , PKAKBTλ) + ∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ) + ∆(PKKPQ, PKAKAPQ)
= Pr{KA 6= KB}+∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ) + ∆(PK , PKA)
≤ 2∆(PKAKB , PKK) + ∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ)
≤ 3∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ).
By taking the infimum over all PQ ∈ P(T λ), we have
1
3
ǫπ,3 ≤ inf
PQ
∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ).
Finally, it is straightforward to see that δπ,2 ≤ infPQ ∆(PKAKBTλ , PKKPQ).
Then, as in the case of symmetric-key encryption, we can show the following theorem which states relationships between
all the formalizations above (i.e., six possible formalizations above).
Theorem 7: Let π be a key agreement protocol such that PK is the uniform distribution over K. Then, we have explicit
relationships between δπ,i, ǫπ,j for i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} as follows:
(1)δπ,2 ≤ δπ,1 +
√
δπ,1 ln 2
2
and δπ,1 ≤ −2δπ,2 log 2δπ,2|K| ,
(2)
2
ln 2
ǫ2π,2 ≤ ǫπ,1 ≤ −2ǫπ,2 log
2ǫπ,2
|K||T |λ ,
(3)ǫπ,3 ≤ ǫπ,2 ≤ 2ǫπ,3.
Furthermore, it holds that:
(i) For arbitrary key agreement π, it holds that π’s security of Type (i, 2) and Type (i, 3) are strictly equivalent for every
i ∈ {1, 2};
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(ii) Suppose that a key agreement protocol π satisfies ǫπ,2 = o( 1log |K|+λ log |T | ). Then, it holds that π’s security of Type
(i, 1), Type (i, 2), and Type (i, 3) are equivalent for every i ∈ {1, 2};
(iii) Suppose that a key agreement protocol π satisfies δπ,2 = o(1/ log |K|). Then, it holds that π’s security of Type (1, j)
and Type (2, j) are equivalent for every j ∈ {1, 2, 3};
(iv) Suppose that a key agreement protocol π satisfies δπ,2 = o(1/ log |K|) and ǫπ,2 = o( 1log |K|+λ log |T | ). Then, all π’s
security of Type (i, j) are equivalent.
Proof: First, we show (1): By Lemma 14 in Appendix B, we have
δπ,2 = ∆(PKAKB , PKK)
≤ Pr{KA 6= KB}+min{∆(PKA , PK),∆(PKB , PK)}.
In addition, by Proposition 10 in Appendix A we have
∆(PKA , PK)
2 ≤ ln 2
2
D(PKA ||PK)
=
ln 2
2
(log |K| −H(KA))
≤ ln 2
2
δπ,1.
Therefore, we have δπ,2 ≤ δπ,1 +
√
δpi,1 ln 2
2 .
Conversely, we have
Pr{KA 6= KB} ≤ δπ,2, and
log |K| −H(KA) ≤ −2∆(PKA , PK) log
2∆(PKA , PK)
|K| (31)
≤ −2δπ,2 log 2δπ,2|K| ,
where (31) follows from Proposition 11. Thus, we obtain
δπ,1 ≤ −2δπ,2 log 2δπ,2|K| .
Secondly, the proof of (2) is given in the same way as that of Theorem 1, and we omit it.
Thirdly, we show (3): By definition, we have ǫπ,3 ≤ ǫπ,2. In addition, for any ǫ > 0, there is a distribution PQ such that
ǫπ,3 + ǫ ≥ ∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ). Then, we have
ǫπ,2 ≤ ∆(PKATλ , PKAPQ) + ∆(PKAPQ, PKAPTλ)
≤ ǫπ,3 + ǫ+∆(PQ, PTλ)
≤ 2(ǫπ,3 + ǫ),
where the last inequality follows from ∆(PQ, PTλ) ≤ ∆(PKAPQ, PKATλ) ≤ ǫπ,3 + ǫ. Thus, we obtain ǫπ,2 ≤ 2ǫπ,3.
Finally, (i) follows from (3) above; (ii) follows from Lemma 10 and (2), (3) above and ; Similarly, (iii) follows from Lemma
10 and (1) above; and (iv) follows from (ii) and (iii) above.
C. Lower Bounds and Impossibility Results
For any key agreement protocol which constructs a key sharing resource [PK] starting from a correlated randomness resource
[PXY ], we show a lower bound on the advantage of distinguishers as follows. The proof is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 13: Let [PK] be a key sharing resource. For any key agreement protocol π, and for any simulator σ, we have
∆D(π(( s−→)l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ]), σ([PK ])) ≥ 1− 2H0(X,Y )−H∞(K).
In particular, we have
∆D(π(( s−→)l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ]), σ( s s)) ≥ 1− 2
H0(X,Y )
|K| .
From Lemma 13, we obtain lower bounds on the adversary’s (or distinguisher’s) advantage by Theorem 8 below, and the
required size of a correlated randomness resource by Corollary 2 below.
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Theorem 8: For any key agreement protocol π such that PK is the uniform distribution over K, we have the following lower
bounds on the adversary’s advantage:
(i) 2
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2
π,1 +
√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2
π,1 ≥ 1−
2H0(X,Y )
|K| , if δπ,1 ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) 2
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2
π,1 + ǫπ,j ≥ 1−
2H0(X,Y )
|K| for j ∈ {2, 3}, if δπ,1 ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) 2δπ,2 +
√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2
π,1 ≥ 1−
2H0(X,Y )
|K| ;
(iv) 2δπ,2 + ǫπ,j ≥ 1− 2
H0(X,Y )
|K| for j ∈ {2, 3},
where δπ,i and ǫπ,j are parameters of formalizations of correctness and security, respectively, defined in Definition 7.
Proof: By Proposition 6, we have
inf
σ
∆D(π(( s−→)l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ]), σ( s s)) ≤ ǫπ,3 + 2δπ,2. (32)
Therefore, by (32) and Lemma 13 we obtain
ǫπ,3 + 2δπ,2 ≥ 1− 2
H0(X,Y )
|K| .
By Theorem 7, we have explict relationships between δπ,i and ǫπ,j as follows:
δπ,2 ≤ δπ,1 +
√
ln 2
2
δ
1
2
π,1
≤
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2
π,1 if δπ,1 ∈ [0, 1];
ǫπ,3 ≤ ǫπ,2 ≤
√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2
π,1.
Therefore, by combining the above inequalities we obtain all lower bounds in Theorem 8.
Corollary 2: Suppose that a key agreement protocol π is (δ, ǫ)-secure in the sense of Type (i, j) in which PK is the uniform
distribution over K. Then, we have the following lower bounds on the size of a correlated randomness resource:
(i) 2H0(X,Y ) ≥
{
1−
[√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2 + 2
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2
]}
|K| for i = j = 1, if δ ∈ [0, 1];
(ii) 2H0(X,Y ) ≥
{
1−
[
ǫ+ 2
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2
]}
|K| for i = 1 and j ∈ {2, 3}, if δ ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) 2H0(X,Y ) ≥
{
1−
(√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2 + 2δ
)}
|K| for i = 2 and j = 1;
(iv) 2H0(X,Y ) ≥ {1− (ǫ+ 2δ)} |K| for i = 2 and j ∈ {2, 3}.
Proof: The proof of Corollary 2 immediately follows from Theorem 8.
Finally, from Lemma 13 we obtain Proposition 7 which is an impossibility result for key agreement. Also, we provide
Corollaries 3 and 4 below, as illustrations of impossibility results which are special cases of Proposition 7. The proofs
immediately follow from Theorem 8 and Proposition 7, and we omit them.
Proposition 7: Let [PK] be a key sharing resource, and let [PXY ] be a correlated randomness resource. In addition,
let ǫˆ be a real number such that ǫˆ < 1 − 2H0(X,Y )−H∞(K). Then, there exists no key agreement protocol π such that
( s−→)∞‖( s←− )∞‖ [PXY ] π,ǫˆ=⇒ [PK ].
Corollary 3: There is no key agreement protocol π such that ( s−→ )∞‖( s←− )∞ π,ǫˆ=⇒ [PK ] for ǫˆ < 1 − 1/2H∞(K). In
particular, there is no (δ, ǫ)-secure key agreement in the sense of Type (i, j) which constructs s s (even with 1-bit) starting
from authenticated communications, if δ, ǫ ∈ [0, 1] are some real numbers such that:
(i)
√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2 + 2
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2 <
1
2
for i = j = 1;
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(ii) ǫ+ 2
(
1 +
√
ln 2
2
)
δ
1
2 <
1
2
for i = 1 and j ∈ {2, 3};
(iii)
√
ln 2
2
ǫ
1
2 + 2δ <
1
2
for i = 2 and j = 1;
(iv) ǫ+ 2δ < 1
2
for i = 2 and j ∈ {2, 3}.
Corollary 4: Let l and s be nonnegative integers with l < s. In addition, we denote the l-bit key sharing resource by
s s
l, and let [PK]s be an s-bit key sharing resource with min-entropy H∞(K). Then, there is no protocol π such that
( s−→ )∞‖( s←− )∞‖ s sl π,ǫˆ=⇒ [PK ]s for ǫˆ < 1 − 2l−H∞(K). In particular, there is no (δ, ǫ)-secure key agreement (or
key-expansion) protocol in the sense of Type (i, j) which constructs the s-bit key sharing resource s ss from the l-bit key
sharing resource s sl, if δ, ǫ ∈ [0, 1] are some real numbers which satisfy the inequality in Corollary 3.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated relationships between formalizations of information-theoretic security for symmetric-key
encryption and key-agreement protocols in a general setting. Specifically, we showed that, for symmetric-key encryption,
the following formalizations are all equivalent without any condition on system parameters:
• Stand-alone security including formalizations of extended (or relaxed) Shannon’s secrecy using the statistical distance,
information-theoretic indistinguishability and semantic security by Goldwasser and Micali; and
• Composable security including formalizations of Maurer et al. and Canetti.
In addition, we have shown that there are two security formalizations which are not equivalent to the above formalizations
without a certain condition: one is the formalization of extended (or relaxed) Shannon’s secrecy using the mutual information,
and the other is the formalization given by the difference between the distribution of plaintexts and the one conditioned on
a certain ciphertext. However, these two formalizations will be equivalent to others, if we impose a certain condition which
seems to be satisfied in a usual designing of protocols.
Furthermore, we also derived lower bounds on the adversary’s (or distinguisher’s) advantage and secret-key size required
under all of the above formalizations. In particular, we could derive them all at once through our relationships between the
formalizations. In addition, we briefly observed impossibility results which easily follow from the lower bounds.
Moreover, we showed similar results (i.e., relationships between formalizations of stand-alone and composable security,
lower bounds, and impossibility results) for key agreement protocols.
We hope that our results on relationships between security formalizations shown by a formal and rigorous way are useful
in designing the protocols by selecting suitable system parameters. In particular, our results explicitly imply that encryption
and key agreement protocols defined by stand-alone security remain to be secure even if they are composed with other ones,
though it may be implicitly assumed by some researchers that the stand-alone security formalizations are sufficient for providing
composable security in the information-theoretic settings.
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APPENDIX A: DEFINITION AND INEQUALITY
Definition 8: Let X be a random variable which takes values in a finite set X . Then, the min-entropy H∞(X) and the
Hartley entropy H0(X) are defined by
H∞(X) = min
x∈X
{− logPX(x)}, H0(X) = log |{x ∈ X|PX(x) > 0}| .
Definition 9: Let X , Y , and Z be random variables associated with distributions PX , PY , and PZ , respectively. The mutual
information between X and Y , denoted by I(X ;Y ), is defined by
I(X ;Y ) := H(X)−H(X |Y ),
where H(X) (resp. H(X |Y )) is the Shannon entropy (resp. the conditional Shannon entropy). Also, the conditional mutual
information of X and Y given Z , denoted by I(X ;Y |Z), is defined by
I(X ;Y |Z) :=
∑
z
PZ(z)I(X ;Y |Z = z).
Definition 10: Let X , Y , and Z be random variables associated with distributions PX , PY , and PZ , respectively, where X
and Y take values in a finite set X . The statistical distance (a.k.a. variational distance) between two distributions PX and PY ,
denoted by ∆(PX , PY ), is defined by
∆(PX , PY ) :=
1
2
∑
x∈X
|PX(x) − PY (x)| .
Also, for conditional probabilities PX|Z := PXZ/PZ and PY |Z := PY Z/PZ , the statistical distance between PX|Z and
PY |Z , denoted by ∆(PX|Z , PY |Z) (or ∆(X,Y |Z)), can be defined by
∆(PX|Z , PY |Z) :=
∑
z
PZ(z)∆(PX|Z=z , PY |Z=z).
Then, by definitions, note that ∆(PX|Z , PY |Z) = ∆(PZX , PZY ).
In this appendix, for completeness, we describe several inequalities in the following, which are necessary to show the proofs
of propositions in this paper. Note that these inequalities are not new.
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Proposition 8: Let (X,Y ) and (X ′, Y ′) be random variables associated with two distributions PXY and PX′Y ′ , respectively,
in a finite set. Then, we have
max (∆(PX , PX′),∆(PY , PY ′)) ≤ ∆(PXY , PX′Y ′)
Proof: From the definition of statistical distance, it follows that
2 ·∆(PXY , PX′Y ′) =
∑
x
∑
y
|PXY (x, y)− PX′Y ′(x, y)|
≥
∑
x
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y
PXY (x, y)−
∑
y
PX′Y ′(x, y)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∑
x
|PX(x) − PX′(x)|
= 2 ·∆(PX , PX′).
Proposition 9: Let X and X ′ be random variables associated with two distributions PX and PX′ , respectively, in a finite
set. For an arbitrary random variable Y associated with a distribution PY , we have ∆(PXXY , PXX′Y ) = P (X 6= X ′).
Proof: The proof follows from the following direct calculation:
2 ·∆(PXXY , PXX′Y ) =
∑
x
∑
x′
∑
y
|PXXY (x, x′, y)− PXX′Y (x, x′, y)|
=
∑
x
∑
y
|PXXY (x, x, y)− PXX′Y (x, x, y)|
+
∑
x
∑
x′ 6=x
∑
y
|PXXY (x, x′, y)− PXX′Y (x, x′, y)|
=
∑
x
∑
y
(PXY (x, y) − PXX′Y (x, x, y)) +
∑
x
∑
x′ 6=x
∑
y
PXX′Y (x, x
′, y)
= 1− Pr{X = X ′}+ Pr{X 6= X ′}
= 2Pr{X 6= X ′}.
Corollary 5: Let X and X ′ be random variables associated with two distributions PX and PX′ , respectively, in a finite set.
Then, we have ∆(PX , PX′) ≤ Pr{X 6= X ′}.
Proof: The proof follows from Propositions 8 and 9.
Proposition 10 (Pinsker’s inequality, Lemma 12.6.1 in [7]): Let X1 and X2 be random variables associated with two
distributions PX1 and PX2 , respectively, in a finite set. Then, we have
D(PX1 ‖ PX2) ≥
2
ln 2
∆(PX1 , PX2 )
2.
Corollary 6: Let X and Y be random variables associated with two distributions PX and PY , respectively. Then, we have
I(X ;Y ) ≥ 2
ln 2
∆(PXY , PXPY )
2.
Proof: The proof immediately follows from Proposition 10 by setting PX1 := PXY and PX2 := PXPY .
Proposition 11 (Classical case of Fannes’s inequality, Theorem 16.3.2 in [7]): Let X1 and X2 be random variables associated
with two distributions PX1 and PX2 , respectively, on a finite set X such that ∆(PX1 , PX2) ≤ 14 . Then, we have
|H(X1)−H(X2)| ≤ −2∆(PX1 , PX2 ) log
2∆(PX1 , PX2)
|X | .
Corollary 7: Let X and Y be random variables which take values in finite sets X and Y , respectively. If ∆(PXY , PXPY ) ≤ 14 ,
we have
I(X ;Y ) ≤ −2∆(PXY , PXPY ) log 2∆(PXY , PXPY )|X ||Y| .
Proof: The proof immediately follows from Proposition 11 by setting PX1 := PXY and PX2 := PXPY .
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APPENDIX B: TECHNICAL PROPOSITIONS
In this appendix, we show several propositions which are used in this paper.
Proposition 12: Let X be a random variable which takes values in a finite set X . In addition, let Y and Z be random
variables taking values in a finite set Y defined by
Y := f(X,R), Z := g(X,R′),
where f, g are mappings and R,R′ are random variables such that X,R,R′ are pairwisely independent. We define
α := sup
PX∈P(X )
∆(PXY , PXZ),
β := max
x∈X
∆(PY |X=x, PZ|X=x),
where the supremum in α ranges over all distributions PX ∈ P(X ). Then, we have α = β.
Proof: First, we show α ≤ β: For an arbitrary distribution PX , we have
∆(PXY , PXZ) =
1
2
∑
x,y
|PXY (x, y)− PXZ(x, y)|
=
1
2
∑
x
PX(x)
∑
y
|PY |X=x(y|x) − PZ|X=x(y|x)|
≤ 1
2
max
x
∑
y
|PY |X=x(y|x)− PZ|X=x(y|x)|
= max
x
∆(PY |X=x, PZ|X=x).
Therefore, we get α ≤ β.
Secondly, we prove α ≥ β: Let x0 ∈ X be an element such that it gives β, i.e., x0 = argβ. For any ǫ > 0, we define a
distribution PXˆ by
PXˆ(x) :=
{
1− γ if x = x0,
γ
|X |−1 otherwise,
where γ is a positive real number such that γβ ≤ ǫ. Let Yˆ := f(Xˆ, R) and Zˆ := f(Xˆ, R′). Then, we have
α ≥ ∆(PXˆYˆ , PXˆZˆ)
≥ (1− γ)∆(PYˆ |Xˆ=x0 , PZˆ|Xˆ=x0)
= (1− γ)β
≥ β − ǫ.
Therefore, we have α ≥ β.
Lemma 14: For a key agreement protocol, we have
Pr{KA 6= KB} ≤ ∆(PKAKB , PKK)
≤ P (KA 6= KB) + min{∆(PKA , PK),∆(PKB , PK)}.
Proof: Since we can easily see the existence of a distinguisher with advantage Pr{KA 6= KB}, the first inequality of the
two is easy. We show the second inequality in the following. From triangle inequality, we have
∆(PKAKB , PKK) ≤ ∆(PKAKB , PKAKA) + ∆(PKAKA , PKK)
= Pr{KA 6= KB}+∆(PKA , PK).
Similarly, it is shown that ∆(PKAKB , PKK) ≤ Pr{KA 6= KB}+∆(PKB , PK).
Lemma 15: For two binary random variables X and Y over a set {0, 1}, and for ε ∈ [0, 1], the following two inequalities
are equivalent: ∣∣∣∣∣∣Pr{X = Y } −
∑
ℓ∈{0,1}
Pr{X = ℓ}Pr{Y = ℓ}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε, (33)∣∣∣Pr{X = Y = ℓ} − Pr{X = ℓ}Pr{Y = ℓ}∣∣∣≤ 1
2
ε for every ℓ ∈ {0, 1}. (34)
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TABLE I
PXY AND ITS MARGINALS
x\y 0 1 PX(x)
0 a b a+ b
1 c d c+ d
PY (y) a+ c b+ d 1
Proof: It is sufficient to show that (33) ⇒ (34), since (34) ⇒ (33) is obvious. Letting PXY be a joint probability distribution
of X and Y given by TABLE I, (33) is equivalent to∣∣a+ d− (a+ b)(a+ c)− (c+ d)(b + d)∣∣ ≤ ε. (35)
Since it holds that a+ b+ c+ d = 1, (35) becomes |ad− bc| ≤ ε/2. Furthermore, using a+ b+ c+ d = 1 again, we have∣∣PXY (0, 0)− PX(0)PY (0)∣∣ = ∣∣a− (a+ b)(a+ c)∣∣ ≤ ε
2
,∣∣PXY (1, 1)− PX(1)PY (1)∣∣ = ∣∣d− (c+ d)(b + d)∣∣ ≤ ε
2
which imply (34).
Remark 3: Note that (33) ⇒ (34) does not generally hold if X and Y are not binary random variables.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 13
Let Supp(PXY ) = {(x, y)|PXY (x, y) > 0} ⊂ X × Y be the support of PXY . For any kA ∈ K, and kB ∈ K, we define
Ωπ,T
λ
kA,kB
:=


∃(x, y) ∈ Supp(PXY ) such that
ti = fi(x, t1, . . . , ti−1) for odd i
tλ = (t1, t2, . . . , tλ) ∈ T λ tj = fj(y, t1, . . . , tj−1) for even j
kA = gA(x, t1, t2, . . . , tλ)
kB = gB(y, t1, t2, . . . , tλ)


.
For any (x, y) ∈ Supp(PXY ), kA ∈ K, and kB ∈ K, we also define
Ωπ,T
λ
kA,kB ,x,y
:=


ti = fi(x, t1, . . . , ti−1) for odd i
tλ = (t1, t2, . . . , tλ) ∈ T λ tj = fj(y, t1, . . . , tj−1) for even j
kA = gA(x, t1, t2, . . . , tλ)
kB = gB(y, t1, t2, . . . , tλ)

 .
Then, for any simulator σ, we have
∆D(π(( s−→)l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ])), σ([PK ]))
≥ 1
2
∑
(kA,kB ,tλ)∈K×K×T λ
∣∣Pπ(kA, kB, tλ)− Pσ(kA, kB, tλ)∣∣
= max
B⊂K×K×T λ
{Pπ(B)− Pσ(B)}
≥
∑
(kA,kB),tλ∈Ω
pi,T λ
kA,kB
(
Pπ(kA, kB, t
λ)− Pσ(kA, kB, tλ)
)
,
= 1−
∑
(kA,kB),tλ∈Ω
pi,T λ
kA,kB
Pσ(kA, kB , t
λ), (36)
where Pπ and Pσ are distributions by the systems π(( s−→)l‖( s←− )l−1‖ [PXY ]) and σ([PK ]), respectively.
We now need the following claim.
Claim 2: Suppose that gA and gB in the key agreement protocol π are deterministic. Then, we have∑
(kA,kB),tλ∈Ω
pi,T λ
kA,kB
Pσ(kA, kB, t
λ) ≤ 2H0(X,Y )−H∞(K).
Proof: We note that Pσ(kA, kB, tλ) = 0 if kA 6= kB , and that Pσ(kA, kB, tλ) = PK(k)Pσ(tλ) if kA = kB = k ∈ K.
Thus, we have ∑
(kA,kB),tλ∈Ω
pi,T λ
kA,kB
Pσ(kA, kB, t
λ) =
∑
k
PK(k)
∑
tλ∈Ωpi,T
λ
k,k
Pσ(t
λ)
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≤ 1
2H∞(K)
∑
k
∑
(x,y)∈Supp(PXY )
∑
tλ∈Ωpi,T
λ
k,k,x,y
Pσ(t
λ)
=
1
2H∞(K)
∑
(x,y)∈Supp(PXY )

∑
k
∑
tλ∈Ωpi,T
λ
k,k,x,y
Pσ(t
λ)


≤ 1
2H∞(K)
∑
(x,y)∈Supp(PXY )
1 (37)
= 2H0(X,Y )−H∞(K).
where (37) follows from Ωπ,T λk,k,x,y ∩ Ωπ,T
λ
k′,k′,x,y = ∅ if k 6= k′, since we assume that gA and gB are deterministic.
We are back to the proof of Lemma 13. If gA and gB are deterministic, the proof of Lemma 13 directly follows from (36)
and Claim 2. We next show that the statement of Lemma 13 is true, even if we remove the assumption. Suppose that gA or gB
is probabilistic. Let RA (resp. RB) be a finite set, and suppose that gA (resp. gB) chooses a random number rA ∈ RA (resp.
rB ∈ RB) according to a probability distribution PRA (resp. PRB ). For each fixed (rA, rB) ∈ RA × RB , a key agreement
protocol π(rA,rB) is specified in which gA with inputting rA and gB with inputting rB are deterministic. Therefore, we can
apply the lower bound derived before. Hence, even if gA (resp. gB) chooses rA ∈ RA (resp. rB ∈ RB) according to PRA
(resp. PRB ), this lower bound cannot be improved. Therefore, the proof of the lemma is completed.
